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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 42(a), the Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to 
this Court on March 24, 2014. [R. 738-40.] This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code§ 78A-4-103(2)G). 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err in holding plaintiff to previously established dead-
lines and denying plaintiffs motion for continuance under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f), where 
plaintiff presented no explanation, by affidavit or otherwise, why he had failed to pursue 
discovery during the 21 months the case had been pending; and where plaintiffs motion 
for additional time failed to describe specific proposed discovery or how it would aid 
position to summary judgment? 
Standard of Review: Utah appellate courts ''apply an abuse of discretion 
standard in reviewing the denial of a Rule 56(f) motion and overturn it only if the denial 
of the motion exceeds the limits of reasonability." Petersen v. Riverton City, 2010 UT 
58, ,r 25, 243 P.3d 1261 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Campbell, 
Maack & Sessions v. Deb,y, 2001 UT App 397, iJ 6, 38 P.3d 984. 
2. In the absence of affidavits or other evidence, including expert testimony, to 
support plaintiffs claims of legal malpractice and causation, did the district court err in 
holding that no evidence suggested defendants' representation fell below the applicable 
standard of care, and that plaintiffs alleged damages were caused by his own failure to 
even attempt to comply with the divorce court's orders? 
Standard of Review: In reviewing a grant of summary judgment:, this Court 
reviev,,s the trial comi: s legal conclusions for conectness. Christensen &. Jensen, P. C. v. 
Barrett & Daines, 2008 UT 64, ~ 19, 194 P.3d 931. The Cout1 should "determine only 
whether the trial comi en-ed in applying the governing iaw and \1..1hether the trial court 
correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact.'~ H arline v. Barker, 912 
P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a legal malpractice case. Mr. Robinson sued Jones \Valdo, Mr. Clark, and 
Ms. Bean (collectively "Jones ,Valdo"), alleging they mishandled their representation of 
Ivlr. Robinson in connection with his divorce. [R. 1-14.] In short, Mr. Robinson alleges 
that the defendants should have ensured that the settlement of his divorce was contingent 
on his ability to refinance a parcel of cmmnercial real estate that was awarded to him in 
the settlement. 
Mr. Robinson, acting prose, filed his Complaint on October 31, 2011. [R. 1-32.] 
He retained counsel some three months later, in February 2012. [R. 724.] 
On January 2, 2013, the trial court entered a Stipulated Discovery Plan and Sche-
duling Order ("Scheduling Order"). [R. 177-80.] The Scheduling Order set a fact dis-
covery deadline of June 28, 20 i3, and required ivfr. Robinson to designate experts by July 
26,2013. [R. 178.] 
On April 8, 2013, after 13 months of representation, Mr. R.obinson's counsel with-
drew. [R. 61-63, 268-69.] Jones \~Valdo immediately filed a Notice to Appear or Appoint 
Counsel. [R. 270-72.] 
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From October 2011 to July 2013, Mr. Robinson pursued only minimal discovery, 
designated no experts, and failed to file or make any request to extend the discovery or 
expert designation deadlines. [See generally R. 207-91, 726.] 
On July 28, 2013, after the expiration of discovery and expert disclosure dead-
lines, Jones Waldo filed a motion for summary judgment. [R. 497-99.] Mr. Robinson 
responded with a motion for extension of time to conduct discovery under Rule 56(f), but 
did not oppose the facts or arguments presented in support of summary judgment. [R. 
504-08.] 
On Febmary 12, 2014, the trial court issued a written order denying Mr. Robin-
son's Rule 56(f) motion and granting Jones Waldo's motion for summary judgment. [R. 
724-28.] 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Underlying Divorce Settlement. 
In 2007, Mr. Robinson retained Jones Waldo to represent him in a divorce pro-
ceeding against his ex-wife, Debra Robinson. [R. 2-3, 195.] During the course of their 
marriage, the couple had acquired multiple real estate properties. The most valuable 
property was the "Phoenix Plaza," a strip mall in St. George. [R. 3.] Throughout much 
of 2007, Mr. Robinson and Ms. Robinson personally negotiated, without the assistance of 
counsel, in an effort to agree upon the division of various real properties in which they 
both claimed an interest. [See R. 3, 195.] They eventually agreed to participate in a med-
iation, which was scheduled for November 2, 2007. [R. 3.] 
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Several days prior to the scheduled mediation, Ms. Robinson gave Ivlr. Robinson 
an analysis of incorne and occupancy rates of the Phoenix Plaza, as well as her estimate 
that the Phoenix Plaza was worth $7.5 million. [R. 4.] She gave this document both to 
Mr. Robinson and his Certified Public Accountant. [R. 715.] 
On November 1, 2007, the day before the scheduled mediation, lVfs. Robinson's 
counsel emailed Ms. Bean a proposed stipulation for discussion at the mediation. [R. 4.] 
According to Mr, Robinson, this draft stipulation "generalJy reflected the principles that 
the parties agreed on in their discussions leading up to the mediation sessions." [Id.] The 
draft stipulation, in relevant part, awarded Mr. Robinson title to the Phoenix Plaza, sub-
ject to his obligation to refinance the mortgage on the Plaza in order to pay Ms. Robinson 
approximately $1.8 million. [R. 5, 6, 20.] That same day, Ms. Bean sent Ms. Robinson's 
proposed stipulation to Mr. Clark to request his comments. [R. 561-62.] Mr. Clark rep-
lied: 
There probably ought to be some protections in the event [Mr. Robinson] is 
unable notwithstanding his "best efforts" to refinance the Phoenix Plaza. 
At a minimum there should be a cap on the interest under [Section] 16.B 
[of the draft stipulation]. If for some reason he can't refinance within the 
next year, he ends up owing her 20% interest, and it just keeps ciimbing? 
His incentive to refi is captured at the already-high I 0% rate, so I'm not 
sure why he would agree to tack on an additional amount every month~ but 
at a minimum there needs to be a cap or some kind of out if for some rea-
son he can't refinance. [R. 562.] 
Valuation was l\1r. Robinson's primary concern, and after evaluating infonnation 
from Ms. Robinson, his CPA, and several realtors he telephoned during the mediation 
[R. 715], and being fully aware that he could take more time to veiify the infonnation 
provided by Ms. Robinson, Mr. Robinson (and Ms. Robinson) signed a Stipulation and 
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Property Settlement Agreement ("Settlement Agreement") on November 2, 2007. [R. 30-
31, 684.] 
The Settlement Agreement awarded Mr. Robinson title to the Phoenix Plaza, sub-
ject to his obligation to refinance the Phoenix Plaza and pay Ms. Robinson approximately 
$1.8 million. [R. 20.] The agreement provided that Mr. Robinson "shall file the loan re-
finance application within 15 days of the date of this Agreement [R. 21-22], and provided 
for interest to accrue on the $1.8 million obligation at a flat 8% rate if the refinancing was 
not completed within 120 days [R. 21]. In other words, in the weeks leading up to an as-
yet-unknown nationwide real estate crash, Mr. Robinson agreed to take real estate and to 
give Ms. Robinson cash. 
On November 5, 2007, the first business day after he signed the Settlement 
Agreement, Mr. Robinson called and emailed Ms. Bean to express his desire to ''stop" the 
Settlement Agreement from becoming effective, alleging Ms. Robinson had "gross[ly] 
overvalue[d]" the Phoenix Plaza. [R. 311, 354, 561.] Even though Mr. Robinson ex-
pressed "buyer's remorse," Ms. Bean repeatedly advised Mr. Robinson of the importance 
of filing a loan application as set forth in the Settlement Agreement. For example, on 
November 29, 2007, Ms. Bean asked Mr. Robinson by email, "[Ms. Robinson] said she 
would work with you on getting a good deal on the mortgage-are you two working on 
this?" [R. 651.] On December 5, 2007, Ms. Bean told Mr. Robinson, "'[i]t appears that 
we need to get moving on [the refinance] immediately .... Have you filed a loan appli-
cation?" [R. 658.] On December 9, 2007, Ms. Bean advised Mr. Robinson '"our time at 
this point is running on your refinancing of the Plaza and I would advise you to move 
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forward on doing so.~: [R. 662.] On December l 0, 2007 ~ Jvls. Bean advised Mr. Robin-
sort, ·'J would encourage you to continue using your best eff01is to refinance:·· [R. 666]. 
On October 11, 2008, Mr. Clark again advised Ivfr. Robinson to "get an application for 
·' fi · r,, pi r-1 1 • • 1 ••, rn C'7£7 me re mancmg or me 1aza on me ana pursue tl as vigorous y as you can:· L1'-. o I o. 1 
Mr. Robinson "admit[ted] that he and his attorneys/the Defendants discussed the 
need to file an application to refinance the Phoenix Plaza Property," and "both Ms. Bean 
and Mr. Clark suggested that Plaintiff should attempt to submit an application." [R. 685-
86.] Mr. Robinson's emails reveal that he did not submit the application because he was 
gambling that interest rates would drop. [R. 594, 651-52.] For example, on November 
29, 2007, Mr. Robinson stated: "We are working on it, but rates have been doing a bit of 
a roller-coaster. If I can lock a rate slightly below the 6% mark, I will. Making progress; 
but I may still need an additional month or two." [R. 651.] Mr. Robinson reasoned that 
"most analysts think that rates will drop in December and, again, in January." [R. 652.] 
Ms. Bean responded back, "my concern is that rates might just as well go up and then 
you would also be in a mess and want to totally redo the deal." [R. 654.] 
Notwithstanding the advice of Iv1s. Bean and the express requirement of ihe Set-
tlement Agreement that he do so, Mr. Robinson never filed a refinance application within 
the fifteen days after signing the Settlement Agreement or at any time since. [See R. 369, 
686.] On February 22, 2008, 1\1s. Robinson provided Mr. Robinson with the financial 
report that ~1r. Robinson claimed was necessary to submit an application. [R. 412, 716.] 




On February 7, 2008, Ms. Robinson filed a motion in the underlying divorce case 
to enter a decree consistent with the Settlement Agreement. [R. 7-8, 312, 357-58.] In her 
motion, Ms. Robinson argued that Mr. Robinson had "no excuses for failing to fill out a 
loan application because he actually needed no financial statements or other accounting 
infonnation until ... after the application was submitted [and Mr. Robinson] has his own 
direct access to that infonnation." [R. 8.] In partial response to Ms. Robinson's motion, 
and in view of Mr. Robinson's request that Jones Waldo attempt to undo the Settlement 
Agreement, Jones Waldo filed a motion to set aside the Settlement Agreement. [R. 312, 
360-63.] 
Ms. Bean and Mr. Clark, however, explained in emails to Mr. Robinson the low 
probability of setting aside the Settlement Agreement he had voluntarily signed: 
We can only get this agreement set aside if we prove that Debra [Ms. Ro-
binson] committed active fraud or conceahnent--part of the difficulty is that 
you had access to all the deposits and anything else that you wanted to re-
view and you also had the same access to the CPA and your realtor for in-
put. . . . [U]nless we can prove fraud or concealment, we don't have a 
strong basis for setting aside the deal otherwise and their position will be 
that you simply want a new deal. [R. 662; see also R. 676.] 
On November 17, 2008, the divorce court denied the motion to set aside the Set-
tlement Agreement, entered an order enforcing its terms, and entered a divorce decree 
that incorporated those tenns. [R. 365-70, 376-89.] The court found that "Mr. Robinson 
did not do what he specifically agreed to do [in the Settlement Agreement] to initiate the 
refinance process. None of us will ever know given that, whether had he done so, the re-
finance would or would not have occurred." [R. 369.] 
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Mr. Robinson terminated Jones Vvaldo~s represen1ation shortly after the November 
175 2008~ ruling and retained nevi' counsel to appeal the ruling. [R. 10-1 l.J The Utah 
Court of Appeals affim1ed the decision of the divorce comi and "note[ d] that Husband~s 
ability to provide evidence that performance was impossible or highly impracticable is 
severely limited where he never actually applied for a loan as contemplated, let alone 
having done so in the time frame set forth by the [Settlement Agreement]." [R. 400; Ro-· 
binson v. Robinson, 2010 UT App. 96, ~ 12, n.4, 232 P.3d 1081.] 1v[r. Robinson's peti-
tion for writ of certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court was denied. [R. 11.] 
Notvvithstanding the exhaustion of his appeals, Mr. Robinson still failed to comply 
with the Settlement Agreement. The trial court in the divorce proceeding eventually en-
tered a $2.3 million judgment against him. [R. 11, 314.] 
B. The Malpractice Action. 
Mr. Robinson sued Jones \J\TaJdo for malpractice on October 31, 2011, generally 
alleging that Mr. Clark and Ms. Bean failed to adequately advise and represent him in 
connection with the November 2, 2007 mediation. [See R. 4-7.] From the time he filed 
his Complaint on October 31, 2011, through the date of the court-ordered discovery dead-
line of June 28, 2013, Mr. Robinson conducted almost no discovery. He made no effort 
to take any depositions, and he did not appear at the deposition of lv[s. Robinson. 1 He did 
1 l\1r. Robinson's assertion that he convinced his divorce counsel to attend Ms. Robin-
son~ s deposition is incoITect. [R. 554.] No one appeared at !v1s. Robinson's deposition 
on Ivlr. Robinson's behalf. Unfmiunately (but inconsequentially), the trial court record 
does not reflect this. 
..g .. 
not designate any experts by the appointed deadline, and he failed to file or make any re-
quest to extend the discovery or expert deadlines. [See R. 514-15, 730-32.] 
On July 29, 2013, after the discovery and expert disclosure deadlines expired, 
Jones Waldo filed its motion for summary judgment. [R. 497-99.] Jones Waldo argued 
that summary judgment was appropriate for two reasons: First, Mr. Robinson had failed 
to designate an expert to opine that Jones Waldo's conduct fell below the applicable stan-
dard of care. Second, Jones Waldo argued that Mr. Robinson could not provide any evi-
dence that the alleged malpractice caused his alleged damages, because ( 1) Ms. Robinson 
would never have agreed to the provision Mr. Robinson now claims Jones Waldo should 
have put in the Settlement Agreement; (2) Mr. Robinson's own actions-specifically, his 
failure to attempt to refinance the Phoenix Plaza-were the cause of the divorce judg-
ment against him; (3) there was no evidence that Mr. Robinson would have obtained a 
better outcome absent the alleged malpractice; and ( 4) collateral estoppel barred Mr. Ro-
binson's loss-causation theory. [R. 318-30.] Jones Waldo served the motion to Mr. Ro-
binson at his address of record. [R. 268, 331, 499.] 
Mr. Robinson did not request any extension of time from Jones Waldo to oppose 
the motion for smmnary judgment. 2 Instead, he filed a Rule 56( f) Motion for Extension 
2 Mr. Robinson argues that Jones Waldo's counsel ignored his _request for an extension of 
time to respond to the motion for summary judgment, and in doing so likely violated the 
Standards of Professionalism and Civility. [See, e.g., App. Bf. 11-12, 51; R. 547, 549, 
703.] That is incorrect. Counsel for Jones Waldo received two infonnational emails 
from Mr. Robinson's counsel, Mr. Kimball. Mr. Kimball's first email stated that "I will 
be filing a request for extension of time to respond to your motion today. If you would 
like to discuss this matter today, please feel free to contact me." [R. 567 ( emphasis add-
ed).] Mr. Kimball's second email stated that "[i]t may be that I will ask for more time ... 
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of Time to Respond to Summary Judgment. In that motion and in subsequent briefs in 
support of his motion, Mr. Robinson made no attempt to dispute or set f01ih a separate 
statement of additional facts to controvert any of the facts presented in Jones Waldo's 
, • ,.. • 1 .._ -r t"d 11 ,r n b' monon ror summary Juagrnent. l'-'Or a1 . NH. 1\.0 mson present any argmnent to oppose 
Jones Waldo~s arguments in favor of summary judgment. Instead, in :Mr. Robinson~s 
opening brief, he asse1ied that he was unaware Jones Waldo had filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment, and argued that he needed additional time for discovery because he had 
been unable to retain new counsel for months. [See R. 502-1 O.] In his reply memoran-
dum, Mr. Robinson asserted that his new counsel would like to depose Ms. Bean and Mr. 
Clark, that he had retained an expert-albeit providing no infonnation on the experf s qu-
alifications, anticipated testimony, or anticipated timing of a report-and that he could 
not previously depose Ms. Bean because of his difficulty in acquiring counsel. [ See R. 
546-56.] 
On February 12, 2014, the district court issued a written ruling denying Mr. Ro-
binson's Rule 56(f) motion and granting Jones Waldo's motion for summary judgment. 
In denying Mr. Robinson's Rule 56(f) motion, the trial court ruled that (1) rvfr. Robinson 
vv1as '"required to follow the discovery plan and designate expert witnesses by July 26, 
given the several hundred pages you have filed and my still nascent familiarity with the 
facts. But it is too soon to do more than briefly speculate on that supposition. Please ad-
vise." [R. 569 (emphasis added).] These emails were informational. They did not re-
quest an extension of time. !vforeover, this argument is a red heITing. If Mr. Kimball be-
lieved Jones Waldo's counsel to be uncooperative or unresponsive, he could have moved 
the trial court for an extension of time to respond to the smmnary judgment. He did not 
do so. 
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2013"; (2) Mr. Robinson's "original counsel withdrew in April and he had over three 
months to retain new counsel and either comply with the discovery plan and scheduling 
order to seek to amend the plan"; (3) Mr. Robinson "missed the deadline to designate any 
expert witnesses; he has missed all subsequent deadlines and cut off dates"; and (4) Mr. 
Robinson "did not present a sufficient basis to excuse his lack of diligence in completing 
discovery." [R. 726.] 
Having denied the motion for continuance, the court turned to the merits of Jones 
Waldo's motion for summary judgment. The court granted the motion, on the basis that 
(1) Mr. Robinson "has not filed any affidavits or other evidence which raise an issue of 
disputed material fact to survive a motion for summary judgment"; (2) without an expert 
witness, Mr. Robinson "cannot demonstrate that the defendants' representation of him in 
his divorce action fell below the applicable standard of care"; and (3) "the affidavits, 
emails, and other evidence presented by defendants in support of their motion demon-
strate that plaintiff cannot show that any alleged breach by defendants caused any loss to 
him." [R. 726-27.] Specifically, the trial court stated, 
Based upon his failure to even attempt to comply with the Stipulation [i.e., 
his settlement agreement with Debra Robinson], this Court and other courts 
have ruled against [Mr. Robinson] in other cases. [Mr. Robinson] cannot 
show that any actions by defendants have caused the financial losses he is 
facing. As other courts have held, his failure to even attempt to comply 
with the Stipulation ha[ s] been the cause of his losses. 
[R. 727.] 
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SUIVIMARY OF ARGUIV!ENT 
The trial court's deniaj of Mr. Robinson~s Rule 56(f) motion \;\Jas not an abuse of 
discretion. Mr. Robinson never explained hO\:v further discovery would uncover disputed 
facts for opposing summary judgment. He never described a viable theory for opposing 
summary judgment even if his request for more discovery had been allowed. Mr. Robin-
son was also dilatory. After nearly two years of litigation, during most of which Mr. 
Robinson was represented by counsel, and for several months after his counsel withdrew, 
Mr. Robinson made almost no effort to pursue the case. He had no good explanation for 
this prolonged passivity. In contrast, Jones Waldo relied on the trial comi' s Scheduling 
Order, honored the applicable discovery deadlines and diligently pursued discovery. Ac-
cordingly, the trial comi's conclusion that Mr. Robinson "did not present a sufficient ba-
sis to excuse his lack of diligence" [R. 726] was correct, and its denial of Mr. Robinson: s 
Rule 56(f) motion should be affinned. 
The trial court also c01Tectly granted Jones Waldo's smrunary judgment motion. 
Mr. Robinson had made no effort to oppose the motion for summary judgment. Given 
the lack of any opposition, the trial court properly accepted Jones ~/aldo's proffered facts 
as true. The record also suppmis the trial court's conclusion that an expe1i witness was 
necessary to establish the standard of care and breach. Whether Jones Waldo should 
have counselled Mr. Robinson against accepting a divorce settiement in which he re-
ceived property and. agreed to refinance it in order to buy his wife out of her equity is not 
per se unreasonable--it happens every day. \Vhether something about this transaction or 
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the complexity of this case made it different is certainly not within the ordinary experi-
ence of lay jurors, so expert testimony was needed. 
Finally, even assuming Ms. Robinson would have agreed to a different deal-a 
proposition she expressly rejected in her deposition [R. 316-17, 421-24 ]-the outcome is 
completely speculative because Mr. Robinson never applied for the financing and be-
cause the record provides no evidence of what a different outcome might have looked 
like. Rather than apply for refinancing, Mr. Robinson chose to gamble on interest rates. 
The lower court acted correctly in accepting the divorce court's conclusion that Mr. Rob-
inson's "failure to even attempt to comply with the stipulation [has] been the cause of his 
losses." 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DENIAL OF MR. ROBINSON'S RULE 56(f) 
MOTION WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The trial court denied Mr. Robinson's Rule 56(£) motion because (1) Mr. Robin-
son was "required to follow the discovery plan and designate expert witnesses by July 26, 
2013"; (2) Mr. Robinson's "original counsel withdrew in April and he had over three 
months to retain new counsel and either comply with the discovery plan and scheduling 
order to seek to amend the plan"; (3) Mr. Robinson "missed the deadline to designate any 
expert witnesses; he has missed all subsequent deadlines and cut off dates"; and (4) Mr. 
Robinson "did not present a sufficient basis to excuse his lack of diligence in completing 
discovery." [R. 726.] 
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Aecording to the Utah Supreme Court, "[ w]e review the denial of a rule 56([) mo-
tion for an abuse of discretion . .,~ Overstock.com, Inc. v. S,nartBargains, Inc., 2008 UT 
55, ~ 20, 192 P.3d 858. ''V\1e will not reverse the district court's decision to grant or deny 
a rule 56(f) motion for discovery unless it 'exceeds the limits of rcasonability. m Jc!. 
(quoting Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1242-43 (Utah 1994)). 
Some of the relevant factors in determining whether a rule 56(f) motion is 
warranted include ... (1) an examination of the party~s rule 56(f) affidavit 
to determine whether the discovery sought will uncover disputed material 
facts that will prnvent the grant of summary judgment or if the party re-
questing discovery is simply on a "fishing expedition," (2) whether the par-
ty opposing the summary judgment motion has had adequate time to con-
duct discovery and has been conscientious in pursuing such discovery, and 
(3) the diligence of the party moving for summary judgment in responding 
to the discovery requests provided by the party opposing summary judg-
ment. 
Overstock, 'if 21; see also Crossland, 877 P.2d at 1243 ("the trial court need not grant rule 
56(f) motions that are dilatory or lacking in merit"); Jensen v. S1nith, 2007 UT App 152, 
1j 2, 163 P .3d 657 ("a court should not grant a rnle 56(f) motion to protect a paiiy from its 
own lack of diligence or from the merits of the motion for smmnary judgment"). 
Here, all three Overstock factors strongly favor denying Mr. Robinson's Rule 
56(f) motion, and the trial court did not exceed the "limits of reasonability" in so doing. 
A. Mr. Robinson has never explained how further 
discovery would uncover disputed material facts 
for opposing summary judgment. 
As to the first Overstock factor, the Utah Supreme Court has required that the Rule 
56(f) affidavit do more than merely recite the conclusion that additional discovery will 
help a party resist summary judgment 
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Simply asserting that more discovery is needed and that a proper response 
to the motion for summary judgment is impossible due to the other party's 
failure to cooperate with discovery requests is inadequate to overcome 
summary judgment. . . . Parties must offer more than conclusory assertions 
to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial, and cannot justify 
further discovery without providing a viable theory as to the nature of the 
facts they wish to obtain. 
Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, 157, 70 P.3d 1 (quotation marks and 
tions omitted); see also Riddle v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 2004 UT App 487, 1 17, 105 
P.3d 970 ("[T]he trial court properly refused to allow [plaintiffJ to conduct further dis-
covery because [plaintiffJ failed to explain in his affidavit how additional discovery 
would aid in his opposition to summary judgment."). 
Here, Mr. Robinson sought to depose Ms. Bean and Mr. Clark. Mr. Robinson 
failed, however, to meet his burden to show how this proposed discovery would uncover 
disputed material facts to aid in opposing summary judgment. The only explanation by 
way of affidavit3 was contained in Mr. Robinson's supplemental affidavit offered in con-
nection with his reply memorandum in support of the motion for additional time: 
If I can depose Bean I can ask her to explain the attached emails, and I an-
ticipate her responses will give me the information to better oppose a sum-
mary judgment motion. I also want to ask Clark if he feels that Bean ade-
quately followed his advice to protect my interests. I don't lmow exactly 
how long this would take .... [R. 554.] 
3 In his "Sur Sur Response Memorandum" he also stated he desired to depose Mr. Clark 
and Ms. Bean to ask them questions such as "why mediation was attempted without hav-
ing accurate financial infonnation and valuation information regarding the marital prop-
erties in advance of the mediation" and "why was the settlement document not revised to 
contain appropriate representations and warranties with safeguards concerning leases and 
property values?" [R. 704.] 
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lvfr. Robinson never explained what infonnation he expected to obtain from lvis. 
Bean, or how it might defeat a summary judgment motion that was based on failure to 
identify an expert witness on the applicable standard of care. The same is true of Mr. 
Clark's "feelings" about the sitLiation, and in any event his feelings are irTelevant. This 
did not present a legitimate theory to oppose the motion for summary judgment. See Cal-
lioux v. Progressive Ins. Co, 745 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("[A] conclusory 
assertion that the scheduled depositions were expected to produce matter essential to 
olution of defendant's motion smacks of a fishing expedition for purely speculative 
facts."); Hobnes v. Anierican States Ins. Co., 2000 UT App 85, if 27, 1 P.3d 552 (affirm-
ing denial of a Rule 56(f) motion where additional discovery sought would not be rele-
vant to the legal issues presented in smmnary judgment).4 
B. The trial court properly found l\1r. Robinson did 
not present a sufficient basis to excuse his lack of 
diligence. 
As to the second Overstock factor, the trial comi found that Mr. Robinson "did not 
present a sufficient basis to excuse his lack of diligence in completing discovery." [R. 
726.] That conclusion was based on specific findings regarding lvfr. Robinson's various 
delays in prosecuting the entire case. In view of the totality of these facts and circums-
tances, the trial court concluded that Mr. Robinson "did not present a sufficient basis to 
4 See also Jones ex rel Jones v. Bountifit! City Corp., 834 P .2d 556, 561-62 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) (affinning the denial of a Rule 56(f) motion because additional discovery on 
issues sought were i1Televant); American Towers OViiliers Ass 'n Inc. v. CCI Mechanical, 
Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1195 (Utah 1996) (affim1ing the denial of a Rule 56(f) motion be-
cause, even if facts as believed were discovered, it would have been irrelevant). 
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excuse his lack of diligence in completing discovery." [Id.] This was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
Mr. Robinson's failure to comply with the expert disclosure deadline reflected a 
similar lack of diligence. Mr. Robinson stated for the first time in his Rule 56(f) reply 
brief that "Plaintiff has retained an expert, Orson West Esq., and assumes Defendants 
would like to depose him as well." [R. 548; see also R. 550, 564 (providing no further 
information on Mr. West).] Beyond this brief reference, Mr. Robinson has failed to re-
veal anything else about his expert, leaving the trial court and Jones Waldo to speculate 
about what type of witness he was, what topics he might have addressed, and what he 
might have said about them. This vague, passing reference to an expert provided the trial 
court no information on how the proposed expert might affect summary judgment. 
Ignoring his lack of diligence, Mr. Robinson asserts that trial court's denial of his 
Rule 56(f) motion was "clearly based on the length of time that it took Robinson to retain 
new counsel." [App. Bf. 47.] He contends that any failure on his part to diligently pur-
sue discovery or amend the discovery deadlines arose because "he was intimidated by the 
process and felt his time was better served by seeking counsel." [R. 550.] Those 
excuses, however, do not explain his lack of diligence in pursuing discovery for the 13 
months when he was represented by counsel. 
In Gudmundson v. Del Ozone, 2010 UT 33, 232 P.3d 1059, Ms. Gudmundson 
changed counsel nearly two years after the commencement of the suit. The new counsel 
appeared eight days before the close of fact discovery. The defendants filed summary 
judgment motions after the discovery deadline. Ms. Gudmundson sought leave under 
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Rule 56([) to conduct additional discovery, arguing that she had just obtained new coun-
sel~ and the discovery would reveal evidence relevant to her claims. The district comi 
denied her Rule 56(f) motion and granted defendants~ summary judgment motions. The 
Utah Supreme Court affirmed: 
Although Ms. Gudmundson's current counsel entered an appearance only 
eight days before the close of fact discovery, Ms. Gudmundson has not suf-
ficiently demonstrated that her fonner counsel was incompetent or other-
wise unable to diligently perform the needed discovery. She has not shown 
why her former counsel could not perform the needed discovery .... 
Although rnle 56(f) motions are to be granted liberally, in this case, 
lVIs. Gudmundson's failure to adequately explain the lack of diligence does 
not convince us that the district court exceeded the limits of reasonability 
when it denied the motion. 
Id. ~122-23 (emphasis in original). 
Similarly here, lvfr. Robinson focuses on the three months between the withdrawal 
of his counsel and new counsel's entry of appearance, but he ignores his inactivity during 
the preceding 1 7 months. For 13 of those months, he was represented by counsel. It was 
the failure to pursue the case during the entire 21 months from filing, not just the final 
three months, that the trial comi found to evidence a lack of diligence. It was well within 
its discretion. See Dahl v. Harrison, 2011 UT App 389, ,I 27, 265 P.3d 139 (affinning 
trial courf s conclusion that Ms. Dahl "had been dilatory and that her request for an ex--
tensjon of the fact discovery deadline was not founded in fact or in reason.~'). 
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C. Mr. Robinson has not alleged that Jones Waldo 
failed to respond diligently to discoven'. 
As to the third Overstock factor, Mr. Robinson has not argued that his alleged need 
for additional discovery was caused by delays attributable to Jones Waldo. Accordingly, 
this factor weighs in favor of affinnance as well. 
D. The trial court properly considered Mr. Robinson's 
pro se status. 
Mr. Robinson's arguments rest in large part on his claim that the trial court ex-
ceeded "the limits of reasonableness" because it failed to give him special treatment as a 
pro se litigant. That contention is without merit. 
Mr. Robinson's argument ignores the fact that he was represented for thirteen 
months, but still did not diligently pursue the case. Moreover, under Utah law, "although 
a pro se litigant should be accorded every consideration that may reasonably be indulged, 
we will ultimately hold him to the same standard of lmowledge and practice as any quali-
fied member of the bar." Midland Funding, LLC v. Pipkin, 2012 UT App 185, if 2, 283 
P.3d 541 (quotation omitted). The Utah Supreme Court has warned that "reasonable 
dulgence is not unlimited indulgence." Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ,r 11, 194 P.3d 903. 
In recognition of this principle, the trial court held that "[ w ]bile pro se litigants should be 
accorded every consideration that may reasonabl[y] be indulged, they are bound to follow 
the rules of civil procedure just as counsel are." 
If these pronouncements are to mean anything, they must permit the trial court to 
enforce scheduling orders and other deadlines against pro se litigants. Here, the trial 
court did not exceed "the limits of reasonableness" by expecting Mr. Robinson either to 
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comply with the djscovery plan or to seek to amend the plan. Nor did it exceed "'the lin1--
its of reasonableness'~ by concluding that Mr. Robinson should not have missed the couri•· 
ordered deadlines. 
E. IVir. Robinson ~s :request for relief under Rule 6(b) 
or Rule 37 has been waived and is contrary to 
established law. 
For the first time on appeal, Mr. Robinson contends that his Rule 56(f) motion 
"could actually be considered" under Rule 6(b) or perhaps Rule 37. [See App. Bf. 47-
48.] Those arguments were not made below and have been waived. See 438 Main Street 
v. Easy .Heat Inc., 2004 UT 72, ,r 51, 99 P .3d 80 I ("to preserve an issue for appeal, the 
issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportu-
nity to rule on the issue. . . . Issues that are not raised at trial are usually deemed 
waived."). 
Notwithstanding this waiver, under Rule 6(b ), "'the com1 may, for good cause, ex-
tend the time ... on a motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act be-
cause of excusable neglect.'~ Under Utah law, however, "excusable neglect requires 
some evidence of diligence in order to justify relief." Jones v. Layton/Ok/and, 2009 UT 
39, ~ 20,214 P.3d 859 (applying "excusable neglect" standard of Rule 60(b)). In light of 
the district court's findings of lack of diligence, Iv1r. Robinson's Rule 6(b) argument 
would therefore be unavailing even if it had not been waived. 
The newly raised Rule 37 argument also lacks merit. Mr. Robinson contends that 
the trial comi abused its discretion by exceeding its broad discretionary "sanction'~ 
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ers under Rule 37 when it denied Mr. Robinson an extension to designate an expert wit-
ness-in effect excluding his expert. 
First, Mr. Robinson's Rule 37 argument is factually incorrect. Mr. Robinson as-
serts that on August 16, 2014, he moved the trial court for "two extensions," one for time 
to conduct discovery and another to allow the late designation of an expert witness. 
[App. Bf. 47.] This misstates the record. Mr. Robinson's August 16, 2014 motion only 
moved for additional time to conduct discovery with no mention of any expert witness. 
[See R. 500-10.] Mr. Robinson only mentioned an expert, for the first time, in his Rule 
56(f) motion reply brief by vaguely stating "Plaintiff has retained an expert, Orson West 
Esq., and assumes Defendants would like to depose him as well." [R. 548, 550, 564.] 
There was never a request for an extension of the deadline to designate experts. Nor did 
the court apply Rule 37 sanctions to exclude any expert. Rather, the motion only focused 
on the need for further discovery under Rule 56(f). The trial comi properly ruled on the 
motion in view of the standards for Rule 56(f). 
Second, Mr. Robinson's Rule 37 argument is incorrect as a matter of law. In Cal-
lister v. Snowbird Corp., 2014 UT App 243, the Court recently held that a "denial of a 
motion to extend deadlines is not a sanction under rule 37 .... " Id. il 32. This Court re-
fused to apply Rule 3 7 standards, applied the normal "abuse of discretion" standard, 
finned the trial court's refusal to extend the deadline to designate experts, and affinned 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment based on failure to timely designate an ex-
pert. Id. ,r,r 15, 21, 30-34. 
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IL THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED JONES 
WALDO'S MOTION FOR SUMl\1ARY JUDGMENT 
In order to sustain a legal malpractice action, a plaintiff must plead and prove 
"(i) an attorney-client relationship; (ii) a duty of the attorney to the client arising from 
their relationship; (iii) a breach of that duty; (iv) a causal connection between the breach 
of duty and the resulting injury to the client; and (v) actual damages." 1-Iarline v. Barker~ 
912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996). Jones \Valdo moved for sumrnary judgment on the ele-
ments of breach and causation. At the trial court level, Mr. Robinson did not oppose 
Jones Waldo's motion for summary judgment. Rather, Mr. Robinson only moved the tri-
al court for more time to conduct discovery under Rule 56(f). As explained above, the 
trial court properly denied that Rule 56(f) motion. 
What remained was Jones Waldo's unopposed motion for summary judgment. 
The trial court granted the motion because (1) "[ w ]ithout an expert witness, [Mr. Robin-
son] cannot demonstrate that the defendants' representation of him in his divorce action 
fell below the applicable standard of care"; (2) "the affidavits, emails, and other evidence 
presented by defendants in support of their motion demonstrate that plaintiff cannot show 
that any alleged breach by defendants caused any loss to him"; and (3) "[a]s other courts 
have held, his failure to even attempt to comply with the [Settlement Agreement] ha[s] 
been the cause of his losses." [R. 726-27.] 
Now, for the first time on appeal, Mr. Robinson:, argues that: (1.) the trial comi has 
an independent obligation to fen-et out from the record whether issues of fact exist before 
granting summary judgment; (2) there is no need for an expert to prove breach of the duty 
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of care; and (3) there are issues of fact associated with causation. Those arguments were 
not presented to the trial comi. As such, they are waived. Stevens v. Wall, 2011 UT App 
372, ilil 3-4, 264 P.3d 568 (holding that appellant's failure to oppose the summary judg-
ment motion in the trial court results in a waiver of the challenge to the smrunary judg-
ment on appeal); see also Olsen v. Park-Craig-Olsen, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991) (declining to consider arguments that were not raised at the trial court in 
the opposition to summary judgment). "Merely mentioning an issue does not preserve it; 
the issue must be specifically raised, with relevant legal authority, in a manner that alerts 
the court to the need to correct the error." Brady v. Park, 2013 UT App 97, iJ 38, 302 
P.3d 1220. 
A. The trial court has no obligation to ferret out facts 
and make arguments for Mr. Robinson. 
Having failed to oppose the summary judgment motion, Mr. Robinson contends 
that "courts must examine the entire record submitted to detennine whether there are any 
issues of fact." [App. Bf. 40.] The Utah Court of Appeals, however, has specifically re-
jected Mr. Robinson's assertion. An "assertion that a trial court has an independent duty 
to ferret out opposing facts in prior pleadings in the record when a party fails to respond 
to a summary judgment motion is contrary to the rules." See In re Estate of Kuhn, 2008 
UT App 400, at 3, 2008 WL 4748195, *2 (unpublished). 
Under Rule 7(c)(3)(A), a memorandum supporting a motion for summary judg-
ment "shall contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends 
no genuine issue exists. . . . Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is 
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deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted. by the res--
ponding party." Rule 7( c)(l) states that "a paiiy opposing the motion shall file a 
randum in opposition [within 14 days.]'~ And under Rule 56(e), if the summary judgment 
motion is properly supported, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of the pleadings, but the response . . . must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against a party failing to file such a response." 
In Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. Debly, 2001 UT App 397, 38 P.3d 984, 
tiff law finn CMS sued defendant Ms. Debry for failure to pay for ClvfS's representation 
of Ms. Debry in a divorce action. Ms. Debry counterclaimed for malpractice. At the 
close of discovery, CivfS filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the 
counterclaim. Ms. Debry did not file an opposition to the summary judgment motion, 
instead filing a Rule 56(t) motion for additional time. The trial court denied the Rule 
56(f) motion and granted CMS 's motion for sununary judgment. Id. ,r,r 4-5. 
[W]hen a party ... fails to file any responsive affidavits or other eviden-
tiary materials allowed by Rule 56(e), the trial court may properly conclude 
that there are no genuine issues of fact unless the face of the movant's affi-
davit affinnatively discloses the existence of such an issue. 
Here, in the face of CMS' s motion for sununary judgment, Debry 
failed to submit either an affidavit or any other acceptable evidentiary mate-
rials to rebut the motion. Accordingly, the trial court properly assumed that 
no genuine issues of materiai fact existed and correctly proceeded to deter-
mine whether CMS was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
At a minimum, CMS presented a prima facie case that Debry had 
suffered no damage as a result of its representation. Accordingly, for De-
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b1y's claims to survive CMS's motion, the trial court properly required De-
bry to provide some evidence in support of the essential elements of her 
claim. In failing to submit either an affidavit or any other evidentiary mate-
rials, Debry effectively conceded that no genuine issues of material fact ex-
isted and accepted the facts presented by CMS. Therefore, the trial court 
properly concluded that Debry had suffered no damages as a result of 
CMS' s representation. 
Id. ,r,r 16-17, 20 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
In the present case, the trial court explicitly found Jones Waldo's summary judg-
ment motion was properly supported, so Mr. Robinson could not rest upon mere allega-
tions or denials in the pleadings. Jones Waldo presented a prima facie case that Mr. Ro-
binson could not prove breach of the standard of care and causation of damages. The 
court appropriately expected Mr. Robinson to set forth specific facts showing that there 
were genuine issues for trial. He did not. As was proper under Rule 7(c)(3)(A), the trial 
court deemed the facts set forth in Jones Waldo's summary judgment admitted. And, in 
view of those facts, the trial court properly granted summary judgment for Jones Waldo. 
B. Mr. Robinson's new arguments regarding breach 
of the applicable standard of care lack merit. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that "expert testimony may be necessary to 
'establish [ ] the standard of care required in cases dealing with duties owed by a particu-
lar profession,' especially 'where the average person has little understanding of the duties 
owed' by the particular profession at issue, or the 'case [] involv[es] complex ... allega-
tions'." Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency Inc., 2009 UT App 347, ,r 21, 222 P.3d 775 
(citing Preston & Chambers, P.C. v. Koller, 943 P.2d 260,263 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)). In 
its recent Snowbird case, this Court applied this standard to hold that expert testimony 
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was required to establish whether a ski resort operator had a duty to dig out snow or pro-
vi de warning ropes to prevent a lovv-traveling ski tram from striking a skier on the 
ground. See 2014 UT App 243, 'ilif 10~ 15, 20-21. The Court reasoned that expert testi-
mony is required if the standard of care involves "jssues that do not fall \Vhhin the 
mon knowledge and experience of lay jurors," and the average person would not have 
knowledge of how a reasonable ski operator would act. Id. ,r,r 19-20. 
If an expert is required to show that a reasonable ski operator would rope off areas 
where a tram might collide with a standing skier, then an expert is certainly required to 
establish how a reasonable ]awyer might handle a complex divorce settlement. In viev,, 
of the complexity of this case and applicable law, the trial court properly recognized, and 
l\1r. Robinson never disputed, that jurors would require expe1i testimony to aid them in 
understanding the applicable standard of care and breach of that standard. [See R. 726.]. 
For this reason, the trial comi's grant of sununary judgment should be affin11ed. See Jen-
sen v. Smith, 2007 UT App 152, i1 6, 163 P Jd 657 ("Plaintiff's argument that expert 
timony was not required to prove his claim of medical malpractice was not raised before 
the trial court. Vve therefore need not discuss this argument."). 
In support of his proposition that no expe1i is required to establish breach in this 
case, Mr. Robinson cites George v. Caton, 93 N.M. 370, 600 P.2d 822, 829 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1979), and Nixond01fv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348,352 (Utah 1980). Those cases, how-
ever, are inapplicable to this case. 
In George, the New Mexico Comi of Appeals naITo-wly held that ''[i]t does not re-
quire expert testimony to establish the negligence of an attorney who is ignorant of the 
-26-
applicable statute of limitations." 600 P.2d at 829. Here, the issues do not pertain to a 
statute of limitations or any other bright-line rule that implicates the absolute success or 
failure of a claim as in George. 
In Nixondo,f, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
In the majority of medical malpractice cases the plaintiff must introduce 
expert testimony to establish this standard of care. Expert testimony is re-
quired because the nature of the profession removes the particularities of its 
practice from the knowledge and understanding of the average citizen. 
However, this Court has recognized certain exceptions to the general rule 
requiring expert testimony... . The loss of a surgical instrument or other 
paraphernalia, in the operating site, exemplifies this type of treatment. 
612 P.2d at 352. Here, this is not a medical malpractice case where a doctor lost a sur-
gical instrument in a patient-an act so obviously wrong that courts have recognized it as 
an exception to the requirement of expert testimony to establish the standard of care. Ra-
ther, it is undisputed that this case involves complex allegations, where "[ e ]xpert testimo-
ny is required because the nature of the profession removes the particularities of its prac-
tice from the knowledge and understanding of the average citizen." Id. 
Finally, Mr. Robinson claims for the first time on appeal that Mr. Clark estab-
lished the standard of care in the portion of his email that said, "[t]here probably ought to 
be some protections in the event [Mr. Robinson] is unable notwithstanding his 'best ef-
forts' to refinance the Phoenix Plaza" [R. 562.], and "[a]t a minimum there should be a 
cap on the interest .... " [R. 562.] But the email was simply advice given-it says noth-
ing about the applicable standard of care. "An attorney is required to possess the legal 
knowledge and skills c01mnon to members of his profession, and to represent his client's 
interest with competence and diligence. Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 
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J. 982) ( citations omitted). Vv'hether Iv1r. Clark's email describes the prevailing standard of 
care or a higher standard requires expert testimony. lv1ore to the point, the question in 
this case is not whether the email met the standard of care, but whether the advice given 
in connection with the ultimate settlement of the case--in vvhich Mr. Robinson agreed to 
finance the property to cash his ex-wife out of it, and the escalating penalty interest Mr. 
Clark was wo1Tied about was replaced with a capped 8% interest rate-was consistent 
with the prevailing standard in similar cases. That standard is not within the common 
lmowledge of lay jurors, so expert testimony was required. 
C. l\1r. Robinson's new arguments regardin!! 
causation and damages lack merit. 
"In a legal malpractice action, a plaintiff must plead and prove ... a causal con-
nection between the breach of duty and the resulting injury to the client." H arline, 912 
P.2d at 439. 
In Utah, causation or the connection between fault and damages in legal 
malpractice actions cannot properly be based on speculation or conjecture. 
To prevail in legal malpractice actions, clients must establish actual 
cause--that but for the attorney's wrong their loss would not have oc-
curred-and proximate cause-that a reasonable likelihood exists that they 
would have ultimately benefited. 
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1291 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citation 
omitted). As the trial comi properly found, Mr. Robinson failed to demonstrate that "any 
alleged breach by defendants caused any loss to him." And further, Mr. Robinson's ~'fail-
ure to even attempt to comply with the [Settlement Agreement has] been the cause of his 
losses.'~ [R. 726-27.] 
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1. Mr. Robinson ignored the counsel of Ms. 
Bean when he chose not to refinance. 
Mr. Robinson asserts, without any citation to support his claims, that Jones Waldo 
instructed him "that he did not need to ·make a loan application within the 15 day time 
period" because Ms. Robinson had been the first to breach. [App. Bf. 45.] Mr. Robinson 
contends that, but for this instruction, he would have refinanced. And he contends that he 
sustained damages as a result of the failure to refinance. But the record contains no evi-
dence to support such conjectures. 
Jones Waldo repeatedly and ardently advised Mr. Robinson to submit a refinance 
application. On November 29, 2007, Ms. Bean asked Mr. Robinson by email, "[Ms. Ro-
binson] said she would work with you on getting a good deal on the mortgage--are you 
two working on this?" [R. 651.] On December 5, 2007, Ms. Bean told Mr. Robinson, 
"[i]t appears that we need to get moving on [ the refinance] immediately . . . . Have you 
filed a loan application?" [R. 658.] On December 9, 2007, Ms. Bean advised Mr. Robin-
son "our time at this point is running on your refinancing of the Plaza and I would advise 
you to move f01ward on doing so." [R. 662.] On December 10, 2007, Ms. Bean advised 
Mr. Robinson, "I would encourage you to continue using your best efforts to refinance." 
[R. 666]. On October 11, 2008, Mr. Clark again advised Mr. Robinson to "get an appli-
cation for the refinancing of the Plaza on file and pursue it as vigorously as you can[.]" 
[R. 676.] Even Mr. Robinson "admit[ted] that he and his attorneys/the Defendants dis-
cussed the need to file an application to refinance the Phoenix Plaza Property," and "both 
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jvfs. Bean and Jvlr. Clark suggested that Plaintiff should attempt to submit an application.:: 
[R. 685-86.] 
Mr. Robinson's emails reveal that he did not submit the application because he 
was gambling that interest rates would drop. [R. 594, 651-52.] On November 29, 2007 ~ 
Mr. Robinson, in responding to Ms. Bean's inquiry on the progress of the refinancing ap-
plication, stated: "We are working on it, but rates have been doing a bit of a roller-
coaster. If I can lock a rate slightly below the 6% mark, I will. Making progress, but I 
may still need an additional month or two.'' [R. 65 l.] Mr. Robinson reasoned that "most 
analysts think that rates will drop in December and, again, in January," [R. 652.] Ms. 
Bean responded back, "my concern is that rates might just as well go up and then you 
would also be in a mess and want to totally redo the deal." [R. 654.] 
It appears that Mr. Robinson relies on a March 17, 2008, email from Ms. Bean to 
Mr. Robinson for his proposition that Jones Waldo advised him that he did not need to 
file a loan application. The email, in relevant pati, states: 
I'm pulling the most cmTent Utah cases on impossibility and first to breach 
so we can refocus our prior pleading to now state-now Debra [Ms. Robin-
son] has performed, but it is too late and her tardiness makes the agreement 
impossible to effect and because she was the first to breach ( on the plaza, 
deer valley, etc), you don't have to perform. 
[R. 674.] 
The text and context of this email demonstrate that Ms. Bean was explaining her 
desperate attempt to formulate an argument for the divorce comt justifying Mr. Robin-
son: s non-perfonnance of his refinance obligation. At the time of this email, Mr. Robin-
son and Jones \Valdo were facing Ms. Robinson's motion to enforce the Stipulation and 
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enter a decree of divorce. [R. 357-58.] Ms. Bean was explaining to Mr. Robinson the 
arguments she planned to make to the divorce court in an effort to have the Settlement 
Agreement set aside. She was not "advising" and never did advise Mr. Robinson that he 
need not file an application to refinance the Phoenix Plaza. To the contrary, Ms. Bean 
lamented in the second paragraph of her March 17, 2008, email that it would have been 
"far more effective to have documentation to support our argument re: impossibility 
which is why further support from the lender would be very helpful.'' [R. 674.] 
2. Even if Ms. Bean advised him not to 
refinance, Mr. Robinson still fails to prove 
that this advice caused his alleged damages. 
Even assuming that Mr. Robinson is correct in his assertion that Ms. Bean told 
him not to attempt to refinance the Phoenix Plaza, Mr. Robinson's argument still fails be-
cause Mr. Robinson has never presented an iota of evidence that he would somehow be 
better off today if Ms. Bean had not given this hypothetical advice. Rather, Mr. Robin-
son asks the court to speculate about what would have then occurred and what the ulti-
mate outcome might have been, especially given the real estate crash of late 2007 and 
early 2008. As the divorce court aptly stated, "[n ]one of us will ever know given that, 
whether he had done so [ applied to refinance the Phoenix Plaza], the refinance would or 
would not have occurred." [R. 369]; see also Harline, 912 P.2d at 439 ("[P]roximate 
cause issues can be decided as a matter of law ... when the proximate cause of an injury 
is left to speculation so that the claim fails as a matter of law."). 
Mr. Robinson further argues that Jones Waldo should have negotiated a better Set-
tlement Agreement for him, and that if Ms. Robinson would not have agreed to a better 
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Settlement Agreement for 1V1r. Robinson, "then there would have been no agreement~ and 
the divorce action would have gone to the divorce comi for an equitable distribution of 
the parties' assets." [App. Bf. 26-27.] Mr. Robinson argues that he \;\.rould have gotten a 
better deal from the divorce court. All of this is pure~ unadulterated speculation ,vith no 
evidentiary foundation. 
The record establishes that Ms. Robinson would not have agreed to more favora-
ble terms for Mr. Robinson in the Settlement Agreement. [R. 315-17, 420-28]. And Mr. 
Robinson has utterly failed to offer any evidence that he would have been better off if the 
case had not settled at mediation. Indeed, l\,1r. Robinson has made no attempt-neither at 
the trial level, nor in the Rule 56(±) motion papers, nor on appeal-to approach this issue. 
Mr. Robinson's appeal ultimately suffers the same defects that existed in the trial 
court. He did not, has not, and cannot establish a causal link between the alleged wrong-
doing and his alleged damages. The trial comi properly awarded summary judgment on 
this basis. See Harline, 912 P.2d at 439; see also Christensen & Jensen, P.C v. Barrett 
& Daines, 2008 UT 64, ~~ 25-32, 194 P.3d 931 (affinning trial comi's grant of summary 
judgment because plaintiffs failed to establish causation); Breton v. Clyde Sn0v1,. & Ses-
sions, 2013 UT App 65, ~,r 10-16, 299 P.3d 13 (affinning trial comi's grant of sununary 
judgment because plaintiff caused his own harm). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affinn the trial court's denial of Jvfr. 
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